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February 10, 2013
Dear Consortium Prize Award Committee.
One of the History Department’s majors. Aaron NiekoLs, has asked me to write a letter of support 
for the Consortium Prize Award. 1 enthusiastically support him and think that he is an ideal 
candidate for this award based on the superior paper he produced for my Fall 2012 HIST A47 7: 
Senior Seminar, a research based course that requires students to extensively use primary sources 
and utilize the Consortium Library to its fullest extent. Aaron’s finished research project, 
entitled “The Provisional Government and 1917: The Legitimacy Paradox” is a beautifully 
researched and written exploration concerning the compl icated story of the failure of the 
Provisional Government and its subsequent overthrow.
Aaron literally used the library “on the ground level” and is one of the few students who actually 
used The Great Soviet Encyclopedia as a source (Kevin Keating and I have encouraged my 
seminar students repeatedly to use this source and it is a pleasant surprise when someone does!). 
Aaron used paper sources and electronic sources available at the library but he also used the 
interlibrary Loan services extensively. Not only did his research paper benefit greatly from 
using the Interlibrary Services, but he shared his findings with the class. Several of the seminar 
students wanted to use the collection of documents. The Russian Provisional Government. 1917: 
Documents and it became clear that this three volume collection would be an invaluable addition 
to the Consortium Library. Aaron, showing his typical initiative, sent a request that this work he 
procured by the Consortium Library and 1 sent the request to the History Department’s liaison 
(Kevin Keating) and now our library has its own copy. 1 love the synergy that can happen in a 
senior seminar when the librarians and the library and the student connect. His seminar paper 
shows why a good library' is important. Aaron showed us, through his research and his paper, 
that the two most valuable resources in a library remain books on the shelf and librarians who 
help find new and unavailable sources.
Aaron’s paper and his oral presentation of his research were peerless. He received an A+ in the 
course (a great rarity). 1 encouraged him to submit his paper to the UAA Student Showcase and 
1 am sure that it will be appreciated by a wider audience. 1 am not alone in my very high 
assessment of Aaron’s work, it is shared by rav colleagues. Aaron is one of those wonderful 
students—a student who teaches the teacher to look at questions, sources, and events in new and 
different ways. Aaron's work for my Fail 2012 HIST A4?7: Senior Seminar is a perfect 
illustration of how research should be done (but usually isn't), he went to the library, used the 
search engines and bibliographies, found great primary documents on the library shelves and 
beyond, and brought all of his research together in a masterful paper. He clearly produced “an 
exem plary  undergraduate research project which demonstrates evidence of significant scholarly
investigation and utilization of library resources,” It also is noteworthy to point out that Aaron is 
not only an outstanding scholar hut an exceptionally gracious, modest, and nice individual.
Aaron embodies the best of UAA, and his academic excellence, which has culminated in his 
HIST A 47 7: Senior Seminar research project, should be recognized. Thank you for this 
opportunity to nominate Aaron; if you have any questions or need any additional information, 
please contact me.
Sincerely,
Elizabeth J. Dennison
Professor of History and Chair of UAA History Department
The Provisional Government and 1917: The Legitimacy Paradox
The Provisional Government and 1917 
The Legitimacy Paradox
Aaron Nichols
Uni versity of Alaska Anchorage
Professor E. Dennison
1The significance of the Russian revolution has been a hitter ongoing argument for 
historians and political scientists alike. Couched within that debate is the significance and 
meaning of I bl 7. For some, the significance of 1917 is based around the rise of the Bolsheviks 
to power and the centrality of class struggle. For others, it is a critical moment of hard political 
power wielded by Lenin and the Bolsheviks.1 But, behind that debate, lays the meaning of 1917 
and the Provisional Government. In the simplest of terms, there was a crisis of legitimacy. To 
understand the meaning of 1917 it must be recognized that, while the Russian Provisional 
Government was perceived as a legitimate government externally, internally it was considered 
almost wholly illegitimate. The events of 1917, and thus the events of the revolution and civil 
war that followed, hinged upon the legitimacy and sovereignty of the Provisional Government. 
Thus the Provisional Government represents a critical factor; the understanding of 1917. One 
must recognize that the Provisional Government failed to survive, at least in part, because its 
leaders assumed its legitimacy, while the Russian population increasingly rejected it. The 
leadership utterly failed to obtain a sovereign and legitimate mandate, either through legislation, 
by the popular consent of the Russian people, or by investit ure of authority through institutional 
succession. The purpose of this paper is to illuminate some of the points which caused the 
Provisional Government to fail. In particular there appear three critical reasons for this failure; 
the internal politics of the Provisional Government, its relation to the Army, and its relation to 
the Russian population.
! For a more complete discussion o f the historiographical debates regarding the Russian Revolution see the 
following: Michael Confirm, "The New Russian Historiography and the Old - Some Considerations," History &. 
Memory 21, no. 2 (Fall 2009), Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution, 3rd ed. (New York, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), as well as Boris Kolonitskii, "Russian Historiography o f  the 1917 Revolution: New 
Challenges to Old Paradigms?," History & Memory 21, no. 2 (Fall 2009), Stephen ICotkin, " 199! and the Russian 
Revolution: Sources, Conceptual Categories, Analytical Frameworks," Journal of Modern History 70, no. 2 (June 
1998), C. Merridale, "Redesigning History in Contemporary Russia." Journal o f  Contemporary History 38, no. I 
(2003): 13-28., Ronald Grigor Suny, "Revision and Retreat in the Historiography o f  1917: Social History and Its 
Critics,” The. Russian Review 53 (April 1994). and Ronald Grigor Suny. "Toward a Social History o f  the October 
Revolution," American Historical Review 88 (February 1983).
No historical paper is truly complete without at least a brief explanation regarding some 
of the sources used in its creation. Though a wide range and type of both primary and secondary 
sources represent the research which has gone into this paper, there are several which are of 
particular note. Specifically, examining the Provisional Government and its fall, there are two 
members of the Provisional Government who produced prolific works which have provided 
invaluable primary material. Alexander F. Kerensky and Paul N. Miliukov both wrote 
extensively about the Provisional Government, and their respective roles in it. Many of the 
primary sources in this paper have been drawn from their works. Of these primary sources, 
Kerensky and Browder’s three volumes The Russian Provisional Government 1917: Documents 
has been indispensable. Any thorough investigation of the Russian Provisional Government 
would be incomplete without incorporating the documents in these volumes.1 2 3 Further. Paul N. 
Miliukov's works, specifically his Political Memoirs and Russia ami Its Crisis provided valuable 
contextual perspective of the events of the Revolution, but also the internal workings of the 
Provisional Government. ’ Miliukov’s perspective is valuable, not only because he served as 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and was a powerful member of the Kadet party, but also because of 
his training as an historian. Miliukov was remarkably clear about his experiences, and his 
professional historical training makes his observations that much more valuable. Combined, 
these sources represent a wealth of material which is readily accessible.
For these reasons, Kerensky and Browder’s works, as well as Miliukov’s, largely form 
the basis of much of this paper, as evidenced by their liberal citation within. It is also relevant to 
point out that during their activities in the Provisional Government, Kerensky and Miliukov were
1 Robert Paul Browder arid Aleksandr Fyodorovich Kerensky, eds., The Russian Provisional Government. 1917:
Documents,, Hoover Institution Publications (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1%1).
3 Paul Nikolaevich Miliukov, Political Memoirs (Ann Arbor: University o f  Michigan Press, 1967)
2
3in large part adversarial, and their perspectives differ strongly and offer significant contrast about 
the internal politics of the Provisional Government, This topic in particular will be covered in 
more detail later in the paper. For example, Miliukov and Kerensky both recall in their memoirs 
that one of their early bouts surrounding the structure of the new government was about whether 
it was to be a constitutional monarchy, as suggested by Miliukov, or a socialist republic 
supported by Kerensky,4 In either case, both men recognized that the Provisional Government 
stood on its own, and indeed, it stood virtually alone,
With regard to secondary sources, there are countless volumes which have illuminated 
the Russian Revolution from varying perspectives. The remainder of this paper could be nothing 
more than a list of respectable historians who have produced works on this subject. However, of 
particular value to the creation of this paper, Sheila Fitzpatrick’s The Russian Revolution, and 
Richard Pipes’ A Concise History o f the Russian Revolution are equally indispensable secondary 
sources. In terms of the broader context of not only the Russian Revolution, but the evolution of 
the historiography of'the topic, many of the articles cited in the bibliography have provided much 
needed clarity about the full nature of 1917.5 Of the online sources consulted. Seventeen 
Moments in Soviet History has held a volume of information which has proven extremely useful 
in obtaining materials and brief snapshots of events.
The Legitimacy Paradox
In some respects, the Provisional Government’s legitimacy was stripped by the paradoxes 
of the revolution. By definition, a legitimate government is one which assumes authority: 
"‘conforming to the law or rules” or “(of a sovereign) having a title based on strict hereditary
4 Miliukov, Political Memoirs, p, 410.
5 Refer footnote no, I for a listing o f  critical sources as well.
4right” or “v. to justify or make lawful,”6 For eight months of 1917 in Russia, the spark of liberal 
government flickered to life and then abruptly died, Nicholas 0, the last of the Romanov rulers, 
had been forced by the pressure of World War I and the revolution to abdicate. Russia was 
suddenly without the singular authoritarian leadership which had ruled it for the previous three 
centimes. In the place of the monarchy, Russian political leaders were faced with the difficult 
choices that revolutionary political leaders must confront; how to build a new government in a 
country torn by political and civil strife, compounded by World War I. The creation of a state is 
difficult enough under favorable circumstances, but the formation of a new government in the 
crucible of the Russian revolutionary political climate was a monumental challenge. In 
revolutionary Russia, the new government would become known as the Provisional Government. 
In order to place meaning and significance on 1917 in perspective, the role of the Provisional 
Government must be addressed. Not only does it need to be analyzed in terms of legitimacy in 
the definitive sense, but also terms of how circumstances and events produced effects which 
weakened the Provisional Government’s position.
In democratic societies, a government (regardless of its provisional status) is not 
necessarily legitimate in its ascension without popular consent: In this sense, legitimacy is 
inextricably linked to popular sovereignty. In order for a government to be recognized as 
legitimate it must also be sovereign. If the Provisional Government was legitimate 
internationally and illegitimate domestically, how could it exist simultaneously as both? This 
begets the question; was the Provisional Government sovereign? If a government fails to meet 
the criteria of legitimacy and sovereignty, it is not a government, A government is created by 
either the natural and lawful succession of sovereign authority passing from one person or
6 The Oxford American College Dictionary (Mew York. NY: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2002), s.v. "Legitimate.”
5institution to another or it must have gained its authority f rom a declaration of sovereign 
authority supported by the will of those that a declaration claims to represent. Paul N. Miliukov, 
who played an important role in the Provisional Government as a party leader (Kadet) and orator, 
addressed this philosophical conundrum in his memoirs, “Was there any legal continuity 
between the old order which liquidated itself and the new order created on March 2,1917?
|That| a revolution occurred between them,,.implies a negative answer.’'7
The need for leadership was a critical priority, as seen in almost every' perspective which 
has been related through memoir or historical analysis. The sense of the moment was that the 
revolution and the Russian people needed leadership. The Izvestia report No. 2 of February 28, 
1917 recorded that, “At exactly midnight of February 27, the Executive Committee of the State 
Duma was finally organized...”8 The Temporary Committee was the first construct of 
leadership, having organized itself out of the remaining members of the former State Duma. As 
Kerensky notes, “...the meeting (of the Duma)...agreed to authorize the Sen oren convent to 
appoint a Temporary Committee to restore order and make contact with the public organizations 
in Petrograd.”9 The reality was that by the end of the same day, the members of the Temporary 
Committee were recognizing that they would have to assume more of a leadership role than any 
of the major leaders like Rodzianko, Kerensky, or Miliukov had expected. On 3 March, Izvestiia 
reported the rosier of Provisional Government leaders which the Temporary Committee had 
chosen,10 In some respects, these leaders were equally eager, and equally reticent, to take on any 
greater role of authority; doing so was dangerous, not just politically, but perhaps personally. In 
particular, the former President of the Duma, M.V. Rodzianko, had shown divided sentiments on
! Miliukov, Political Memoirs, pg. 389.
8 Browder and Kerensky, (eds)., Documents, Vol. 1, No.23, pg. 47.
S| Browder and Kerensky, (eds).. Documents, V oU , introduction’, pg. 23.
i0 Frank Odder, ed„ Documents o f Russian History, 1914-1917 (New York: The Century Co., 1927), pp. 308-313.
6how to proceed. Kerensky recalls in his documentation of the Provisional Government that. 
“Rodzianko reveals the dilemma of the majority of the Duma.. .1 have made no revolution and do 
not intend to make one...there is no government... What shall I do? Step aside? Wash my hands? 
Leave Russia without a government? But after all, it is a question of Russia.,. .We have 
obligations to the motherland." *1 When viewed with other works, the feeling expressed by 
Rodzianko represented how many of the Provisional Governments leaders felt; trapped between 
a loyalty to the establishment, and duty or ambivalence to the Russian revolution. For Kerensky, 
and to a lesser degree Miliukov, the political maelstrom was where they operated best.
Overwhelmingly, the consensus was that despite the political and personal differences 
among the members of the Duma, the revolution left them with very little choice, “ ....There 
seemed but one alternative to anarchy...[that the Temporary Committee] ‘was compelled to take 
the responsibility for restoring national and public order,’...forming a new government.”1 2 
While the same held true in Miliukov’s perspective, Miliukov’s account reveals a critical idea, 
“By evening...the revolutionary character of the disturbances had also become clear; and the 
committee decided to take the next step: take power into its own hands.”13 The Temporary 
Committee took the power of government into its own hands, without particularly considering 
due process, or popular right to select their government, even though it clearly lacked a solid 
legitimacy. Worse still, as the historian Richard Pipes would note, “...They [the Provisional 
Government] thought of politics as legislating rather than administering... [they] issued countless 
laws intended to rectify the abuses of the old regime, but never created a set of new institutions
11 Browder and Kerensky (eds.), Documents, Vol. I, ‘introduction? pg. 23.
12 Ibid., pg. 23.
!? Miliukov, Political Memoirs, pg. 392.
to replace those it had destroyed.”14 This was a sentiment shared by Miliukov, in particular, and 
one which would haunt the Provisional Government throughout its days.
In the Provisional Government's defense, the workers’ riots and army mutinies might 
have appeared so pressing that no other possible solution could he envisioned. Order clearly had 
to be restored, hut how was a more difficult question. There were initially four separate 
proposals brought before the “Unofficial Meeting of the Members of the State Duma, February 
27 1917,”*5 As the questions of how to form a new government for revolutionary Russia were 
discussed, “Rodzianko requested haste, for he who hesitates is lost, and suggested putting to a 
vote the 4 proposals moved: (1) to transfer power to the Council of Elders, (2) to form a Special 
Committee, (3) to proclaim the Duma a Constituent Assembly, (4) to elect a commission, which 
would be charged with the organization of the Government”16 Miliukov and Kerensky’s 
accounts both identify the underlying concern. The members of the Temporary Committee 
recognized that they must prove the new government’s legitimacy. The leadership of the 
Provisional Government was operating on the premise that it had a legitimate mandate to govern 
beyond the authority of the old regime which had, by default, fallen to the Temporary 
Committee, “...The majority of the other factions did not accept this proposition and decided to 
organize an unofficial conference of members which through a pri vate meeting, [and] would be 
clothed with the prestige of the Duma.”17 The representatives of some of the parties, Kerensky 
notes, wanted the full Duma to be seated, but true to the liberal ideas of the Provisional 
Government, majority ruled the day, and the Temporary Committee was formed and vested with 
the authoritative power of the Duma. However, it should be noted that whatever the presumption
14 Richard Pipes., A Concise History o f the Russian Revolution, (New York, NY: Knopf. 1995)., pg. 92.
15 Browder and Kerensky (eds.)., Documents., Vot.l, No,22. pg. 45.
56 Ibid,, pg. 47.
a  Browder and Kerensky (eds.)., Documents., V oid, introduction’, pg. 23.
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8of democratic ideals, they still felt necessary to associate the Temporary Committee with the 
“prestige of the Duma” in order to derive some degree of legitimacy from it
For members of the Kadet party, like Mili ukov, the Provisional Government's legitimacy 
was not passed from the body of the Duma, but from the Imperial line of succession, Miliukov 
recalled that, “The members of the government were also named, but since Prince Irivov was 
named as premier in the bloc’s list, the formal creation of the government was postponed until 
his arrival in Petersburg..,"18 Prince Lrivov’s presence and patronage was required, if not only 
because his presence lent legitimacy to the Temporary Committee’s decrees and administrative 
decisions, but also because his presence gave the Temporary Committee slightly more liquid 
political capital than any of the rest of them possessed individually at the time. In essence, the 
State Duma ceased to exist, by consensus of its members, and divested its state authority into the 
Temporary Committee. As the Tsar abdicated to escape the Russian peoples’ wrath, the Duma 
surrendered to the revolution, leaving the Provisional Government as “the plenitude of executive 
and legislative power."19 Even in Kerensky’s compilation of Provisional Government 
documents, there was no single document which transferred the legitimate authority to rule to the 
Provisional Government.20 According to unofficial minutes from the February 27th 1917 
meeting of the State Duma, (which were published on March 15,1921 in Voila Rossii in Prague) 
there was nothing beyond the Duma’s resolution to form the Temporary Committee which 
transferred power.21 Furthermore, having Irivov, the cousin of Tsar Nicholas as Prime Minister, 
was a blow to the Provisional Government’s legitimacy, especially in the eyes of the 
revolutionary population. Including a member of the Romanov family in the new government did
IH Miliukov, Political Memoirs, pg. 392.
I" Browder and Kerensky (eds.)., Documents,, Void, 'Introduction’, pg, 25.
20 Browder and Kerensky (eds,),, Documents., Void, No.22, pg, 45.
2! Unknown., Viola Rossii No. 153 (Prague)., pg.4.
not lend legitimacy as Miliukov had hoped; rather, ii further delegitimized the Provisional 
Government in not only the eyes of the newly formed Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, 
but also the Russian people.
These references illustrate the paradoxical question of how the new Provisional 
Government was attempting to legitimize its succession. The Temporary Committee struggled 
for legitimacy by association with institutions and bodies which were part of the Old regime,
The leaders of the former Duma, like Rodzianko, Miliukov and Kerensky were now invested in 
the Temporary Committee. They, and the other members of the Provisional Government, formed 
by the Temporary Committee on March 2, clearly recognized that the legi timacy of the 
Provisional Government was even more subject to question than the Temporary Committee 
itself. Shelia Fitzpatrick aptly noted that, “The Provisional Government had no electoral 
mandate, deriving its authority 1'rom the now defunct Duma, the consent of the Army High 
Command, and informal agreements with public organizations...Given its fragility and lack of 
formal legitimacy... from the very beginning there were reasons to doubt the effectiveness of the 
transfer of power.”22
Outside of Russia, the question of the legitimacy of the Provisional Government was a 
question of Russia’s necessity to the Allied and Associated powers' need for Russia’s 
involvement for the prosecution of WWI. In the strictest sense, regardless of the political and 
philosophical desires of the Western powers to see Russia transition into a representative and 
liberal state, the recognition of the Provisional Government was a necessity. The value of the 
Russian troops on the Eastern front to the A Hied-Associated war effort cannot be understated,
n  Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution. 3rd ed. (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pg.
46.
While international sources of support or recognition of the Provisional Government 
might seem irrelevant to the overall context of the Revolution, it is key to recognize that it did 
play some role in how the world viewed the Russian Revolution* and did lend a certain aura of 
credibility to the Provisional Government, However, the aura of legitimacy by association did 
not suffice for real legitimate government from within the Russian system. The Izvesdia No. 4 
of March Is* reported,
The French and British Ambassadors have officially notified the President 
of the State Duma, M.V. Rodzianko, that the governments of France and England 
are entering into defacto relations with the Temporary Executive Committee of 
the State Duma, which expresses the True will of the people and is the only legal 
Provisional Government of Russia.23
Kerensky and Browder’s note below the heading belies the reality of the report,
“These..-, items.-*,were rather exaggerated accounts of the early contacts between the Duma and 
the Allied representatives in Petrograd.”24 Even though the Provisional Government had 
achieved external recognition from Britain, France, and Italy hv March 3rt, it was largely 
symbolic and never translated to a head coalescence of legitimacy.
The support or consent of outside authority may have aided the Provisional 
Government’s claims of legitimacy, but it certainly was not enough to convince the proletariat. 
The recognition of the Allied and Associated powers of the Provisional Government certainly 
lent credibility to it in bourgeois circles, and perhaps elsewhere in the upper Army ranks. But in 
so far as the proletariat was concerned, the support of bourgeois industrial-capitalists in the West 
was not the credibility that the Russian people wanted or needed to see. As Kerensky noted,
10
23 Browder and Kerensky (eds,),. Documents,, Vol. 1, No, 50, pg, 68,
24 Ibid., pg. 68.
u“Lenin also accused the Provisional Government of all the mortal sins of capitalism... [but] 
nothing about the basic social reforms -  the agrarian and labor legislation it effected.” 2a
Perhaps if the Western powers had not been engaged so fully in the stalemate of WWI, 
they might have been able to lend more practical and direct support: to the Provisional 
Government. But in terms of international recognition, the history of the Provisional Government 
demonstrates that no amount of external support was sufficient to prop up the Prov isional 
Government against the popular wil l of the Russian people.25 6 27
The question of Russia’s participation in W WI related directly to the Provisional 
Government’s tenuous legitimacy for a number of reasons. The si ngle greatest opponent to the 
Provisional Government’s authority and legitimacy was the Soviet. This was particularly true if 
for no other reason than the bulk of the Army supported the Soviet. In terms of legitimacy, tire 
support and loyalty of the armed forces of the state is one of the key elements, for obvious 
reasons. In the Provisional Government’s case, that support was limited only to the officer corps 
and the upper echelon general staff. Kerensky, for his part, was keenly aware of the disparity.
There was general agreement...their strong political and moral authority within 
the army and the working class civilian populations would greatly increase the 
stability of the government. We felt it to be imperative to erase the false 
impression that the forces of Russian democracy were divided into two camps -  
"revolutionary'’ and ‘bourgeois’.2''
This disparity of support i n the Army not only reflected the insubordinate nature of most 
of the enlisted troops, but it forced the Provisional Government to cooperate with the Soviet;
25 Aleksandr Fyodorovich Kerensky, Russia and History’s Turning Point, 1st ed. (New York: Dwell, Sloan and 
Pearce, 1965), pg. 223.
26 "Note from the Russian Provisional Government and the British Reply Respecting the Allied War Aims," The 
American Journal o f International Law, Supplement, 11, no. 4 (October 1917): pg. #, accessed September 1 ,2 0 12, 
http://w w w.jstor.orgfciable/2212576.
27 A.F. Kerensky, Russia and History’s Turning Point, pg. 231.
an arrangement that a sovereign and legitimate government would not have to accept. The dual 
power arrangement between the Soviet of Workers* and Soldiers' Deputies and the Provisional 
Government was utterly crippling.
Despite the Provisional Government’s assumption of power, the dual power arrangement 
was tenuous at best, and at worst little more than lip service from the Soviet, Kerensky sums up 
the dual power arrangement,
...the Soviet assumed the role of representative of the democracy, i.e. the masses.
It would guard the gains of the revolution from the real or suspected enemies 
inside and outside the government which was in the process of formation... the 
Soviet also moved to restore order in the capital, establish discipline among the 
rebellious troops, and relieve the food shortage.28
In large part, this power sharing was a necessary evil for both the Provisional Government and 
the Soviet. For a number of reasons, the Provisional Government would always be weaker. The 
loyalty of the Army was divided between those who swore allegiance to the Provisional 
Government, and those who supported the Soviets. For its pari, the Soviet had made its role in 
the new regime clear with Order No. 1, “Their attitude... was demonstrated in one of the first 
resolutions of the Executive Committee, which expressed readiness to support the new 
government only, ‘insofar as it does not encroach on the rights of the workers won by the 
Revolution.”29 This placed not only the Army at odds with itself, but the Provisional 
Government and the Soviet at loggerheads.
Just as Kerensky illustrated that there was the division within the between the Provisional 
Government under the title “Committee of the State Duma” and the Soviet of Workers’ and 
Soldiers’ Deputies, so too there was a di vision within the Army. Like most of the Russian
12
3  Browder and Kerensky (eds.), Documents, Vot.l, introduction’, pg. 23. 
29 AT. Kerensky, Russia and History's Turning Point, pg. 2 3 1.
civilian population, the Army divided along class lines. The officer ranks swore fealty to the
Provisional Government while their enlisted proletarian subordinates supported the Soviet.
Even so, by August, when General Kornilov sought to overthrow the Provisional Government
the loyalty of the officer corps came into question. The division was clear, and not unexpected,
when placed in the context of the revolution as a whole. Officer and enlisted found themselves
at odds over not only their political loyalties but their loyalty to the revolution and proletariat, or
to the Provisional Government. Regardless, the implications for the Provisional Government
were clear. Legitimacy was never really a question in anyone’s mind besides the members of the
Provisional Government. As Sheila Fitzpatrick relates in her summary of the Russian revolution,
the reality emerging from this division was matter-of-fact and indisputable:
The Provisional Government does not possess any real power; and its directives 
are carried out only to the extent, that it is permitted by the Soviet which enjoys all 
the essential elements of real power, since the troops, the railroads, the post and 
telegraph are all in its hands. One can say flatly that the Provisional Government 
exists only so long as it is permitted by the Soviet30
It was unsurprising that: the Soviet held the bulk of the political power. The proletariat 
certainly outnumbered those who supported the Provisional Government, as the quote before 
demonstrates. The dual power arrangement which arose because of the division, not only in the 
Army, but in the population as well, was partially the result: of circumstance. The Soviets were 
painfully aware that the Officers and Army High Command (the Stavka) staff were going to 
pledge loyalty to the Provisional Government, because despite the revolutionary upheaval, the 
Provisional Government represented the remaining authority of the Romanovs, Equally, the 
bourgeois and old regime nobility and Russia’s economic sectors would support the liberal aims 
of the Provisional Government. In the midst of the revolution, what little support the Provisional
M Allan K, Wiidman, The End o f she Russian Imperial Army, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), pg. 
260.
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Government had from the Russian population would quickly wane, largely because of these 
bourgeois and monarchial leanings. Within the first two months. Miliukov, as a supporter of a 
constitutional monarchy, would fall victim to the proletariat’s unwillingness to support the 
Provisional Government. As Foreign Minister, Miliukov had “implied a continued interest in 
extending Russian control over Constantinople and the Straits...before public outcry-' and 
renewed street demonstrations forced him to resign,”31
Politics, the saying goes, makes for strange bedfellows. The Provisional Government 
certainly personified that sentiment well. By Miliukov's count of the parlies in his memoirs, 
there were a dozen distinct political parties involved in the Provisional Government. ’2 Some, 
like the Party of People’s Freedom (also known as the Constitutional Democratic Party, or 
Kadets) the Social Democrats. (SD) and the Trudoviks were stronger than others. The 
relationship between the Provisional Government as a convened body representative of those 
parties and the people was the critical element. The divisiveness of party politics would 
eventually force the Kadets to leave the Provisional Government, depriving it of the desperately 
needed consensus within, as well as from without. The sheer number of parties made it a vast 
challenge for legislation to move forward, and when legislation did move forward it often did so 
over the objections of some of the weaker parties. During the debates on land and agrarian 
reform there existed numerous examples of exactly the kind of discord which was sown by the 
array of political opinions contained in the Provisional Government/33 The number of 
resolutions either by the parties of the Provisional Government, or the Soviets, demonstrated the 
discontinuity' of policy toward the Russian proletariat. On a topic as important as agrarian and 
land reforms, consensus was at a premium, yet it remained elusive.
11 Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution, pg. 48.
n  Miliukov, Political M em oirspg. 439.
33 Browder and Kerensky (eds.), Documents, Vol.2, No. 470, pgs. 523-614.
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The intricacies of the political debates which went on in the Provisional Government 
would require more exhaustive explanation than there is space for here. Let it suffice to say that 
the lactionalized nature of the Provisional Government also hampered its quest for legitimacy. 
While the Petrograd Soviet and the other Soviets were largely united in their statement and 
revolutionary goafs, the Provisional Government was by its own democratic nature considerably 
more divested of consensus. The argument may be put forward, and perhaps rightfully so, that 
the Provisional Government was indeed provisional, and temporary . It was intended to serve the 
function of briefly maintaining the state institutions while the Constituent Assembly could be 
called and popular elections held. However, circumstances prevented that sequence of events 
from playing out. Of relevance to the issue of the Provisional Government's legitimacy was the 
decision to postpone the convening of the Constituent Assembly until after the elections of 12 
November.14 There is little disagreement among sources that the decision to postpone the calling 
of the Constituent Assembly represents one of the most disastrous mistakes that the Provisional 
Government made. At a time when the Provisional Government had little enough political 
capital to spend, this decision cost it dearly. Not only did it functionally undermine the 
Provisional Government’s legitimacy in a legal sense, but, more critically, it cost them valuable 
popular support among liberals and socialists.
When viewed in conjunction with the dual power arrangement, the issue of who was to 
represent the head of the new government represented a pressing problem, Lenin was a strong 
leader for the Bolsheviks. In the most simple of terms, the Provisional Government could not 
even agree on a leader, much less install one. This further undermined their claims of 
legitimacy. Prince L’vov had announced his “...rejection of the throne until and unless it was 34
34 fames Von Geldem and Lewis Siegelbaum, "Seventeen Moments in Soviet History." Seventeen Moments in 
Soviet History, The Constituent Assembly, accessed September 2,2012, http://www.soviethBttMy.org/index.php.
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offered to him by the people through the forthcoming Constituent Assembly,” leaving even what 
remained of the Romanov's authority beyond reach.n Miliukov considered that, “Prince L’vov 
did Russia a bad service...”36 But Miliukov was not the only one who recognized that Prince 
L’vov was ill prepared and ill-suited to the job of leading the Provisional Government, However, 
Miliukov also recognized that the circumstances of the Revolution had left them with few better 
options. Kerensky alluded to much the same kind of conclusion, albeit in more conciliatory 
terms.”  For all the shortcomings Miliukov indicted Kerensky of, Kerensky was well aware that 
the balance of power in the Provisional Government hinged around the perceptions of the party 
members. Miliukov argued that associating the Provisional Government with the monarchy was 
the only certain means to ensure the government’s survival long enough to vest itself in 
legitimacy through the Constituent Assembly, “...in order to strengthen the new order, a strong 
governmental authority was needed and that it can he strong only when it relies on the symbol of 
authority to which the masses are accustomed. The monarchy serves as just such a symbol. The 
Provisional Government, by itself, without the support of this symbol, will simply not survive 
until the opening of the Constituent Assembly.”38 The Provisional Government failed to 
establish the kind of leadership that the Bolsheviks had via Lenin, and in so doing, removed one 
more claim to legitimacy.
The intense rivalries and hot debates over policy which enveloped the Provisional 
Government created a slow process of legislation. Even when legislation was proposed and 
voted upon, the Provisional Government often lacked the necessary force to place any legislation 
into effect As a result, much of the reforms demanded of the Pro visional Go vernment by *
n  Browder and Kerensky (eds,), Documents, V e il, ‘introduction’ pg. 25.
*  Miliukov, Political Memoirs, pg. 419.
?7 A F. Kerensky, Russia and History's Turning Point, pg. 228.
,!i Miliukov, Political Memoirs, pg. 411.
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society were reduced to the Government pleading for cooperation. But the harsh demands of the 
revolution required both the Soviet and the Provisional Government to cooperate. The critical 
food supply for the Army and civilian population required a united front because the people 
were one political power that the Provisional Government and the Soviet could not do without. 
One of the first tenuous steps of the Provisional Government had been to appeal to the Soviet, 
“...for Cooperation in Supplying the Population and the Army with Food.'’39 Even here, the 
Provisional Government was relegated to pleas, “Citizens of Russia -  agriculturalist, landowners, 
merchants, railroad employees, and workers -  help our native land, The army and the [civilian] 
population must he fed...”40 Clearly, the Provisional Government had issues far beyond its own 
legitimacy with which to contend.
The conflict within the Provisional Government was not limited to the Army, land 
reform, food supply, or relations with the Soviet. In fact, great debate was heard over the basic 
form of the new government. The Provisional Government, such as it was, was politically 
surrounded. The legitimacy of the Tsar or the Imperial crown, and the legislative authority of the 
Duma had evaporated. In effect, all previous entities and institutions had dissolved and as 
Rodzianko put it, “laded away.”41
While the complications of creating the new government and enacting reforms absorbed 
the Provisional Government, the rifts between government and governed grew. It was not that 
the leadership of the Provisional Government had consciously avoided the major threats to its 
legitimacy; it simply pretended that they never existed. The new government labored as if its 
legitimacy was secured by its investiture from the Duma and the popular revolution. But some
39 Browder and Kerensky (eds.), Documents, Vo!.I, No. 52, pg. 69.
40 Ibid., pg. 70,
4* Browder and Kerensky (eds.). Documents, Veil, No.118, pg. 138.
of the Provisional Government leadership knew better, “...the State Duma would have been the 
bearer of the Supreme Power and the organ before whom the Provisional Government would 
have been responsible. This was the project of the President of the Suite Duma. Bui this project 
was resolutely opposed, mainly by the members of the Kadet Party, followed naturally by the 
whole left wing of the State Duma.. Either side, whether repub! ic or constitutional
monarchy, would have been preferable over the infighting and fractionalization within the 
Provisional Government.
Failures of the Provisional Government; Beyond Legitimacy
When every circumstance and decision made by the members of the Provisional 
Government is analyzed, none of them become as damning as their failure to secure a legitimate 
referendum of its authority. Though economic, social, land, and political policy blunders 
certainly contributed to the Provisional Government’s destruction, careful examination of those 
events and decisions were all functionally administrative, rather than about its political life or 
death. Ironically, when the Temporary Committee had formed on February midnight the 27th, it 
had done so with the premise that,
[Just] as soon as the danger is passed and a firm peace established, we will begin 
preparations for the Constituent Assembly on the basis of direct, equal, secret, and 
universal suffrage. The freely elected representatives of the people will decide 
who better reflects Russian public opinion, we or our adversaries.42 3
This statement revealed a telltale truth; that even as early as March 2ml, Miliukov had recognized
that the Provisional Government had a very weak grip on its legitimacy. But the Provisional
Government failed to call the Constituent Assembly. The question of when the Constituent
Assembly would be called was constantly delayed. First the Assembly was delayed until after
18
42 Browder and Kerensky (eds.), Documents, Vol I, No. 119, pg. 139.
*■' Miliukov, Political Memoirs, pg. 407.
November of 1917. Absent that key element alone, perhaps the Provisional Government might 
have survived. But the Provisional Government continued to make critical missteps which 
eroded its credibility: The Provisional Government ehose to arrest members of the ‘Old Regime*, 
enacted legislation that was perceived as bourgeois economic policy, and dodged effective land 
reform by creating subsidiary commissions rather than directly administering the demands of the 
proletariat.44
In a sense, the arrest of members of the Old Regime was a wholesale attempt by the new 
government to engender support from the proletariat. However, it relied on the presupposition 
that the Provisional Government was indeed anointed by the proletariat with the mantle of 
revolutionary legitimacy. By indicting the Old Regime for the barest gain of political capital, the 
leaders of the Provisional Government undermined their own claims of legitimacy. The 
leadership simply sought to engage a policy which would appease the revolutionary demands of 
the populace, and they failed to choose carefully which sacrificial lamb was led to the slaughter. 
In so doing they again removed a means to establish their legitimacy. At every turn, the leaders 
of the Provisional Government, caught in the crucible of revolution, unwittingly cast out 
opportunities to ensure its survival. In so far as the revolution itself was the bearer of the 
Provisional Government’s authority. Kerensky went so far as to proclaim, “...the Provisional 
Government carried out its entire legislative program with the approval of the whole country and 
thus laid a firm foundation for Russia’s transformation into an advanced state.”45 Kerensky’s 
sentiment illustrated the degree of myopia some of the leaders of the government were viewing 
the revolution under.
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By August the leadership of the Provisional Government knew that it was suffering 
severely in the court of public opinion. Kerensky notes, “...we in the government were acutely 
aware of the need to establish closer links with all sections of the population... without them, we 
were extremely vulnerable to demagogic pressures. ,.”46 But these inroads were difficult, even 
after the State Conference in Moscow. Kerensky was often naive in his perceptions of the 
public, especially at the height of his power in the Provisional Government before the Kornilov 
Affair. In his later recollections o f the Provisional Government, Kerensky stated, “In the 
Soviets.. .Bolshevik influence had virtually disappeared following the July uprising...having 
served their purpose during the collapse of the monarchy, were tending to break up.”4'' It was 
this misperception and others like it, which prevented Kerensky from seeing that the breakup of 
the Soviets was only hardening the proletarian resolve against the Provisional Government. The 
debate between Miliukov and Kerensky was a heated one. Miliukov expressed in his memoirs 
that Kerensky allowed his personal ambitions to get the better of him. “Apparently, he had 
already been propagandized -  and by no means in the ideological sense...”48 Such debates were 
the kind of philosophical deadlock which hamstrung the Provisional Government within its own 
body of leaders.
It would be egregious not to acknowledge the financial and economic factors which also 
played a significant role in the failure of the Provisional Government. Indeed, the very nature of 
the Russian revolution was based on economic hardship and financial disparity. However, this 
subject alone could fill several texts.49 Needless to say, governments require money to operate 
and to operate the institutions which are established to perform the functions required by the
46 Ibid. pg. 325.
47 A.F. Kerensky, Russia ami History’s Turning Point, pg. 324.
4* Miliukov, Political Memoirs, pg. 411.
49 Kerensky and Browder (eds.). Documents. Vol.2 Part III, pgs. 479*770
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legislative body. When decisions about economic and financial issues needed to be made, the
Provisional Government again became caught in the battle between revolution and
administration. The competing interests within the Provisional Government forced a virtual
deadlock of ideologies. Miliukov noted that plans were not action, and action was what the
Provisional Government needed, ‘“Plans for organizing the national economy and measures for
controlling production were to be worked out, ‘without delay’ by the Economic Council and the
Economic Committee. There were many plans, but few possibilities after what had already been
tried.”50 51One editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti from September highlights the sentiment
surrounding the Provisional Government’s economic and social failures. Indeed, the first
sentences were characteristic of the Provisional Government’s popularity, or its lack thereof:
There is no government in Russia, no law, no political actions; instead, an 
abundance of political words. Countless congresses and conferences...and 
speeches made at each of them... The man on the street, who lives under the 
weight of economic factors of everyday life and who looks daily to a change for 
better or worse, on opening the paper every day finds the same torrent of 
speeches, He finally succumbs to the hypnosis of political words and with them 
forgets about the approaching threat of economic facts...the effect of economics 
on life is making itself felt ever more severely and painfully.55
Regardless the Provisional Government’s plans, the lack of forceful and decisive 
legislation which made real changes for the proletariat further undermined what little legitimacy 
the government possessed. It was as if the formation of a Committee or Council was the 
Provisional Government’s answer to the people’s problems. The Committees and Councils 
simply did not satisfy the demands of the revolution, or the Russian people. Even though the 
Provisional Government established the Land Committees in March, land reform was one area 
that the vast majority of the Russian population did not want to stall. The delay between the 
formation of the Provisional Government in late February, and the middle of March, combined
50 ibid., pg, 474.
51 Browder and Kerensky (eds), Documents, Vol. 2, No. 670, pg. 769.
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with the sentiment that the Provisional Government too often represented bourgeois interests in 
its leadership was deadly to the Provisional Government’s credibility with the people.
Conclusions
The Provisional Government was a product of the revolution. It did not initially succumb 
to the revolution, rather the revolution had given the Provisional Government a window to 
succeed. When it did not, like the Romanovs before it, the revolution removed it. While Russia 
marched toward proletarian ideals of equality and progress, the Provisional Government grasped 
for philosophical ideals of liberty. At some level, the reality of 1917 was that revolution 
demanded change, and the change that the Provisional Government promised it failed to deliver. 
When the Russian people were ragged, hungry, and tired of war, the idea of liberal government 
did not put clothes on their backs, food in their bellies nor bring their soldiers home.
In no uncertain terms, the Provisional Government was devoured by its own lack of 
legitimate authority to rule. In almost every area of consequence, whether it was the Army, land 
reform, or fiscal responsibility, the Provisional Government never really accepted the 
responsibility of governing. Instead, its leaders became occupied with legislating rather than the 
dirty business of administering public affairs. Part of the reason for the Provisional 
Government’s unwillingness to administrate public affairs and policy might have been a simple 
product of scale. The men in charge of the Provisional Government, though educated and 
experienced in politics and principle, mistook that knowledge as a mandate to govern, neglecting 
the realistic demands of the act of governing, Thai is to say, there is a vast difference between 
understanding the philosophies of government, and making a complex liberal government 
actually function.
Whatever the complications and contextual disagreements, the Russian Provisional 
Government of 1917 was one of the most important factors in the meaning of 1917. That it 
failed because it lacked legitimacy where it counted most only underscores its importance. The 
Provisional Government had been formed on a thin link to old regime authority which, in due 
course, it stripped from itself. The government had formed absent the one quality which defines 
the authority of government aid  its leaders ignored the imperative to obtain a lawful legislative 
succession. Miliukov, in his memoirs reflected, “We consciously thrust aside all these sources of 
legitimate succession for our government. Only one answer remained -  the clearest and most 
convincing one. I answered: ‘We were chosen by the Russian Revolution!”52 Revolution or no 
revolution, Miliukov had miscalculated the support for the Provisional Government by the 
population.
Looking objectively at the steps of the Provisional Government, there were several 
missed opportunities to obtain legitimacy, or at the very least, some semblance of it. Miliukov in 
particular had alluded to some of those, even though they faced bitter opposition."3 Had the 
Provisional Government acted more quickly to convene the Constituent Assembly, its legitimacy 
might have been secured. The fear on the part of the leadership of the Provisional Government 
that the calling of a Constituent Assembly would rob them of their perceived political authority 
helped ensure that no other outcome could have occurred. Although Miliukov’s suggestion to 
align the Provisional Government with the remnants of the monarchy was detested, it would also 
have produced some degree of legitimacy. Even if the Temporary Committee had chosen not to 
arrest fellow members of the Duma, they would have again remitted some of that institution’s 
legitimacy to themselves. With respect to the Soviet, the leadership of the Provisional
23
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Government might have chosen to resist the dual power arrangement with the Soviet, at least 
more than it did. It is easy to suggest that this was possible, hut the evidence would also suggest 
that it would have been difficult. Yet, as Fitzpatrick noted, the Soviet had consciously chosen to 
show, “deference to the bourgeoisie revolution...”54 Even still, at the time the Soviet hardly 
seemed fully in control of its own elements. The loyalty that the proletarian enlisted in the Army 
gave the Soviet, above all, would have prevented the Provisional Government from distancing 
itself from the dual power agreement.
Finally, there is the inevitable question which historians must ultimately confront. That 
is, so what? What does 1917, the Russian revolution, and the Provisional Government mean, 
here and now? If nothing else, the tale of the Provisional Government is a cautionary one. It has 
profound significance to emerging revolutionary governments, whether they are liberal or not. 
This is especially true of those which have arisen from the Arab Spring. There are critical lessons 
to be taken from the errors of the Provisional Government, not the least of which might be that 
all governments need legitimacy secured by a mandate of the people. Further, these new 
governments should be careful not to snip that legitimacy away. While the significance of 1917 
has been interpreted in different ways depending on the perspective the revolution has been 
viewed from, the meaning of 1917 in the context of the Provisional Government is si mple. 
Revolutions past and present are radical and violent change, and the government which does not 
firmly root itself in the will of the people cannot weather the revolutionary storm.
24
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1A Reflective Essay:
“The Russian Provisional Government and 1917: The Legitimacy Paradox’"
In truth, writing this essay proved more difficult than writing the paper. It is not easy for 
me to qualify or quantify something which is - as I think history is to those of us who study it a 
labor of love and reverence. For me, writing this paper was a powerful experience; powerful 
because it brought a new depth of understanding of the incredible responsibility that historians 
take on when they write about history, however narrow or expansive the scope, lit no uncertain 
terms, this paper represents not only a great deal of research and analysis, but a personal 
revelation about the nature of the historian’s discipline. That is to say, throughout my academic 
career, professors have always communicated the depth of the responsibility and duty of 
historians. 1 had simply never fully understood it: i heard it in each lecture and read it in their 
comments in the margins of papers, but it took this paper to fully realize what that responsibility 
meant.
Writing this paper was as much a test of historical research ability as it was a test of 
writing and discipline. For all its challenges, it proved to be its own greatest reward. This paper 
would simply not have been possible without: the wonderful guidance and direction of Professor 
Dennison, to whom 1 owe the deepest thanks. 1 also owe a great deal o f thanks to the online 
links and resource guides provided by Mr. Kevin Keating, and the Consortium Library staff 
However, this paper would have been impossible without the Inter-Library Loan office, which 
enabled me to obtain copies of The Russian Provisional Government, 1917; Documents by 
Browder and Kerensky, As a single source, The Russian Provisional Government, 1917: 
Documents represented one of the best sources of compiled primary evidence for this paper. 
Browders volumes, and several additional writings by Alexander Kerensky and Paul Miliukov
about the Provisional Government and their respective roles during 1917, quickly became the 
pillars of the paper.
When this paper began, aside from my own limited experience studying Russian history, 
one of the looming challenges was finding primary source material that was relevant, accessible, 
and translated. More to the point, I needed to hone the ability to distinguish between primary 
source material that was simply adequate, and the sources which were truly exceptional. Much of 
the early stages of this paper developed out of reading numerous secondary source materials. 
Many of the journal articles and books on the historiography of the Russian Revolution in 
genera], which Professor Dennison recommended as readings proved invaluable. Based on 
several of the books in Professor Dennison’s personal library, as well as the links provided by 
Mr. Keating's online references to Russian history I was able to fill in most of the general 
blanks. Links Mr. Keating and Professor Dennison provided, like James Von Geidem and Lewis 
Siegelbaum's website, “Seventeen Moments in Soviet History” helped codify and narrow my 
search. Further, and in no small part, because of the course lecture provided by Mr, Keating. I 
was also able to consult several of the volumes of Prokhorov's Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 
something which would often be overlooked by students like me, on the lower shelves next to 
the reference desk.
The modern student is particularly blessed by the benefits of technology. Writing this 
paper would have teen a far more laborious process without the resources available online via 
the Consortium Library. 1 cannot estimate the value of the library's partnerships with search 
databases which provided countless references in historical and political journals. With the 
ability to use the Consortium Library’s resources to the test of my knowledge, 1 was initially 
able to east a broad net for source material and gradually narrow its scope in on the Provisional
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Government, My early eastings for sources were largely based on the sifted and well organized 
sources on Mr, Keating’s Russian/USSR online reference page. With each source I found, either 
online, or in texts and journals, successive sources appeared and 1 attempted to network them 
together; a few sources derived from this book, or that journal article. To be honest, 1 cannot say 
I remember exactly how or when I found the first reference to Browder and Kerensky’s The 
Russian Provisional Government, 1917: Documents. However, it was mentioned in many of the 
other works by authors who had published after the mid-1960s. From its use by other respected 
historians, it certainly warranted more investigation as a seminal set of primary documents.
Much to my initial dismay, a search of the Consortium Library’s collection catalog turned up 
empty. Several copies were available by Inter-Library Loan, and after a bit more investigation to 
easure that these books were worth shipping up. 1 placed a request. In less than a week I had all 
three volumes in hand, and within moments of cracking the first volume’s cover. I knew I had 
one of the best primary sources 1 could have found (short of a Moscow archive, I am sure).
In sum, the process of writing this paper proved to have been both a challenge and a 
reward. It took countless hours of slow gathering, culling, organizing, writing, and re-writing ‘till 
the wee hours of the morning, not to mention the gallons of caffeinated beverages. But it has 
demonstrated to me a truism of historical research: historical research is not only largely 
dependent on the availability and pertinence of sources. Research is equally dependent on the 
resources available to a writer -  like Inter-Library Loan, and research guides by expert reference 
staff - and the writer’s willingness to utilize the guidance of academic mentors. Done right, ihe 
research process is like music, a sort of harmony in motion between research, writer, and
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mentors.
